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Abstract
A secure multi-party batch matrix multiplication problem (SMBMM) is considered, where
the goal is to allow a master to efficiently compute the pairwise products of two batches of
massive matrices, by distributing the computation across S servers. Any X colluding servers
gain no information about the input, and the master gains no additional information about the
input beyond the product. A solution called Generalized Cross Subspace Alignment codes with
Noise Alignment (GCSA- NA) is proposed in this work, based on cross-subspace alignment
codes. The state of art solution to SMBMM is a coding scheme called polynomial sharing (PS)
that was proposed by Nodehi and Maddah-Ali. GCSA-NA outperforms PS codes in several
key aspects — more efficient and secure inter-server communication, lower latency, flexible
inter-server network topology, efficient batch processing, and tolerance to stragglers. The idea
of noise alignment can also be combined with N-source Cross Subspace Alignment (N-CSA)
codes and fast matrix multiplication algorithms like Strassen’s construction. Moreover, noise
alignment can be applied to symmetric secure private information retrieval to achieve the
asymptotic capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent interest in coding for secure, private, and distributed computing combines a
variety of elements such as coded distributed massive matrix multiplication, straggler
tolerance, batch computing and private information retrieval [1]–[40]. These related
ideas converged recently in Generalized Cross Subspace Alignment (GCSA) codes pre-
sented in [40]. GCSA codes originated in the setting of secure private information
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2retrieval [37] and have recently been developed further in [40] for applications to coded
distributed batch computation problems. GCSA codes generalize and improve upon the
state of art distributed computing schemes such as Polynomials codes [2], MatDot codes
and PolyDot codes [3], Generalized PolyDot codes [4] and Entangled Polynomial Codes
[5] that partition matrices into submatrices, as well as Lagrange Coded Computing [6],
[7] that allows batch processing of multiple computations.
As the next step in the expanding scope of coding for distributed computing, re-
cently in [41] Nodehi and Maddah-Ali explored its application to secure multiparty
computation [42]. Specifically, Nodehi et al. consider a system including N sources, S
servers and one master. Each source sends a coded function of its data (called a share)
to each server. The servers process their inputs and while doing so, may communicate
with each other. After that each server sends a message to the master, such that the
master can recover the required function of the source inputs. The input data must be
kept perfectly secure from the servers even if up to X of the servers collude among
themselves. The master must not gain any information about the input data beyond the
result. Nodehi et al. propose a scheme called polynomial sharing (PS), which admits
basic matrix operations such as addition and multiplication. By concatenating basic
operations, arbitrary polynomial function can be calculated. The PS scheme has a few
key limitations. It needs multiple rounds of communication among servers where every
server needs to send messages to every other server. This carries a high communica-
tion cost and requires the network topology among servers to be a complete graph
(otherwise data security may be compromised), does not tolerate stragglers, and does
not lend itself to batch processing. These aspects (batch processing, improved inter-
server communication efficiency, various network topologies) are highlighted as open
problems by Nodehi et al. in [41].
Since GCSA codes are particularly efficient at batch processing and already encompass
prior approaches to coded distributed computing, in this work we explore whether
GCSA codes can also be applied to the problem identified by Nodehi et al. In particular,
we focus on the problem of multiplication of two matrices. As it turns out, in this context
the answer is in the affirmative. Securing the data against any X colluding servers is
already possible with GCSA codes as shown in [40]. The only remaining challenge is
how to prevent the master from learning anything about the inputs besides the result of
3the computation. Let us refer to the additional terms that are contained in the answers
sent by the servers to the master, which may collectively reveal information about
the inputs beyond the result of the computation, as interference terms. To secure these
interference terms, we use the idea of Noise Alignment (NA) – the workers communicate
among themselves to share noise terms (unknown to the master) that are structured in
the same manner as the interfering terms. Because of their matching structures, when
added to the answer, the noise terms align perfectly with the interference terms and as
a result no information is leaked to the master about the input data besides the result
of the computation. Notably, the idea of noise alignment is not novel. While there are
superficial distinctions, noise alignment is used essentially in the same manner in [43].
The combination of GCSA codes with noise alignment, GCSA-NA in short, leads
to significant advantages over PS schemes. Foremost, because it uses GCSA codes, it
allows the benefits of batch processing as well as straggler robustness, neither of which
are available in the PS scheme of [41]. The only reason any inter-server communication
is needed in a GCSA-NA scheme is to share the aligned noise terms among the servers.
Since these terms do not depend on the data inputs, the inter-server communication in
a GCSA-NA scheme is secure in a stronger sense than possible with PS, i.e., even if all
inter-server communication is leaked, it can reveal nothing about the data inputs. In fact,
the inter-server communication can take place before the input data is determined, say
during off-peak hours. This directly leads to another advantage. The GCSA-NA scheme
allows the inter-server communication network graph to be any connected graph unlike
PS schemes which require a complete graph.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem state-
ment. In Section III we state the main result and compare it with previous approaches.
A toy example is presented in Section IV. The construction and proof of GCSA-NA are
shown in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: For positive integers M,N (M < N ), [N ] stands for the set {1, 2, . . . , N} and
[M : N ] stands for the set {M,M+1, . . . , N}. For a set I = {i1, i2, . . . , iN}, XI denotes the
set {Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , XiN}. The notation ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of two matrices.
IN denotes the N × N identity matrix. T(X1, X2, · · · , XN) denotes the N × N lower
4triangular Toeplitz matrix, i.e.,
T(X1, X2, · · · , XN ) =

X1
X2 X1
...
. . . . . .
XN · · · X2 X1
 .
For a matrix M , |M | denotes the number of elements in M . For a polynomial P ,
degα(P ) denotes the degree with respect to a variable α. Define the degree of the
zero polynomial as −1. The notation O˜(a log2 b) suppresses polylog terms. It may be
replaced with O(a log2 b) if the field F supports the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), and
with O(a log2 b log log(b)) if it does not.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a system including 2 sources (A and B), S servers (workers) and one master,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Each source is connected to every single server. Servers are
connected to each other, and all of the servers are connected to the master. All of these
links are secure and error free.
Source A and B independently generate sequences1 of L matrices, denoted as A =(
A(1),A(2), . . . ,A(L)
)
, and B =
(
B(1),B(2), . . . ,B(L)
)
, respectively, such that ∀l ∈ [L],
A(l) ∈ Fλ×κ and B(l) ∈ Fκ×µ. The master is interested in the sequence of product matrices,
AB =
(
A(1)B(1),A(2)B(2), . . . ,A(L)B(L)
)
. The system operates in three phases: 1) sharing,
2) computation and communication, and 3) reconstruction.
1) Sharing: Each source encodes (encrypts) its matrices for the sth server as A˜s and
B˜s, so A˜s = fs(A,ZA), B˜s = gs(B,ZB), where ZA and ZB represent private randomness
(noise) generated by the source. The encoded matrices, A˜s, B˜s, are sent to the sth server.
2) Computation and Communication: Servers may send messages to other servers, and
process what they received from both the sources and other servers. Denote the com-
munication from Server s to Server s′ as Ms→s′ . Define Ms , {Ms′→s | s′ ∈ [S] \ {s}} as
the messages that Server s receives from other servers, and M , {Ms | s ∈ [S]} as the
total messages that all servers receive. After the communication among servers, each
server s computes a response Ys and sends it to the master. Ys is a function of A˜s, B˜s
1The batch size L can be chosen to be arbitrarily large by the coding algorithm.
5Source A
A =
(
A(1), . . . ,A(L)
)
,ZA
Source B
B =
(
B(1), . . . ,B(L)
)
,ZB
Server S
Server 1 · · · Server i1
· · ·
Server iX
· · ·
A˜S
A˜1 A˜i1
A˜iX
B˜1
B˜iX
B˜i1
B˜S
Master
Y1 Yi1
YiX
AB =
(
A(1)B(1), . . . ,A(L)B(L)
)
I(A,B;Y1, Y2, · · · , YS | AB) = 0
A total of R answers downloaded
X possible colluding servers
Fig. 1: The SMBMM problem. Sources generate matrices A = (A(1),A(2), · · · ,A(L)) with
separate noise ZA and B = (B(1),B(2), · · · ,B(L)) with separate noise ZB, and upload
information to S distributed servers in coded form A˜[S], B˜[S], respectively. Servers could send
to each other some messages. For security, any X colluding servers (e.g., Servers i1 to iX in the
figure) gain nothing about A,B. The sth server computes the answer Ys, which is a function
of all information available to it. For effective straggler (e.g., Server S in the figure) mitigation,
upon downloading answers from any R servers, where R < S, the master must be able to recover
the product AB = (A(1)B(1),A(2)B(2), . . . ,A(L)B(L)). For privacy, the master must not gain
any additional information about A,B beyond the desired product AB.
and Ms, i.e., Ys = hs(A˜s, B˜s,Ms), where hs, s ∈ [S] are the functions used to produce
the answer, and we denote them collectively as h = (h1, h2, . . . , hS).
3) Reconstruction: The master downloads information from servers. Some servers may
fail to respond (or respond after the master executes the reconstruction), such servers
are called stragglers. The master decodes the sequence of product matrices AB based
on the information from the responsive servers, using a class of decoding functions
d = {dR | R ⊂ [S]} where dR is the decoding function used when the set of responsive
servers is R.
This scheme must satisfy three constraints.
6Correctness: The master must be able to recover the desired products AB, i.e.,
H(AB | YR) = 0, (1)
or equivalently AB = dR(YR), for some R.
Security & Strong Security: We first define security which is called privacy for workers
in [41]. The servers must remain oblivious to the content of the data A,B, even if X of
them collude. Formally, ∀X ⊂ [S], |X | ≤ X ,
I(A,B; A˜X , B˜X ,MX ) = 0, (2)
In this paper, strong security is also considered. It requires that the information trans-
mitted among servers is independent of data A,B and all the shares A˜[S], B˜[S], i.e.,
I(A,B, A˜[S], B˜[S];M) = 0. (3)
This property makes it possible that inter-server communications happen before receiv-
ing data from sources, and makes the server communication network topology more
flexible. Note that PS does not satisfy strong security because H (AB | M) = 0 in the
PS scheme.
Privacy: The master must not gain any additional information about A,B, beyond
the required product. Precisely,
I(A,B;Y1, Y2, · · · , YS | AB) = 0. (4)
This is the privacy for the master in [41].
We say that (f, g,h,d) form an SMBMM (Secure coded Multi-party Batch Matrix
Multiplication) code if it satisfies these three constraints. An SMBMM code is said to
be r-recoverable if the master is able to recover the desired products from the answers
obtained from any r servers. In particular, an SMBMM code (f, g,h,d) is r-recoverable if
for any R ⊂ [S], |R| = r, and for any realization of A, B, we have AB = dR(YR). Define
the recovery threshold R of an SMBMM code (f, g,h,d) to be the minimum integer r
such that the SMBMM code is r-recoverable.
7The communication cost of an SMBMM code is comprised of these parts: upload cost
of the sources, communication cost among the servers, and download cost of the master.
The (normalized)2 upload costs UA and UB are defined as follows.
UA =
∑
s∈[S] |A˜s|
Lλκ
, UB =
∑
s∈[S] |B˜s|
Lκµ
. (5)
Similarly, the (normalized) server communication cost CC and download cost D are
defined as follows.
CC =
|M|
Lλµ
, D = max
R,R⊂[S],|R|=R
∑
s∈R |Ys|
Lλµ
. (6)
Next let us consider the complexity of encoding, decoding and server computation.
Define the (normalized) computational complexity at each server, Cs, to be the order of
the number of arithmetic operations required to compute the function hs at each server,
normalized by L. Similarly, define the (normalized) encoding computational complexity
CeA for A˜[S] and CeB for B˜[S] as the order of the number of arithmetic operations required
to compute the functions f and g, respectively, each normalized by L. Finally, define the
(normalized) decoding computational complexity Cd to be the order of the number of
arithmetic operations required to compute dR(YR), maximized over R,R ⊂ [S], |R| = R,
and normalized by L. Note that normalization by batch-size L is needed to have fair
comparisons between batch processing approaches and individual matrix-partitioning
solutions per matrix multiplication.
III. MAIN RESULT
Our main result appears in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For SMBMM over a field F with S servers, X-security, and positive integers
(`,Kc, p,m, n) such that m | λ, p | κ, n | µ and L = `Kc ≤ |F| − S, the GCSA-NA scheme
2We normalize source upload cost with the number of elements contained in the constituent matrices A,B. The
server communication cost and master download cost are normalized by the number of elements contained in the
desired product AB.
8presented in Section V is a solution, and its recovery threshold, cost, and complexity are listed
as follows.
Recovery Threshold: R = pmn(`+ 1)Kc + 2X − 1,
Source Upload Cost of A˜[S], B˜[S]: (UA, UB) =
(
S
Kcpm
,
S
Kcpn
)
,
Server Communication Cost: CC =
S − 1
`Kcmn
,
Master Download Cost: D =
R
`Kcmn
,
Source Encoding Complexity for A˜[S], B˜[S]: (CeA, CeB) =
(
O˜
(
λκS log2 S
Kcpm
)
, O˜
(
κµS log2 S
Kcpn
))
,
Server Computation Complexity: Cs = O
(
λκµ
Kcpmn
)
,
Master Decoding Complexity: Cd = O˜
(
λµp log2R
)
.
The following observations place the result of Theorem 1 in perspective.
1. GCSA-NA codes are based on the construction of GCSA codes from [40], combined
with the idea of noise-alignment (e.g., [43]). In turn, GCSA codes are based on a
combination of CSA codes for batch processing [40] and EP codes for matrix partitioning
[5]. CSA codes are themselves based on the idea of cross-subspace alignment (CSA) that
was introduced in the context of secure PIR [37]. It is a remarkable coincidence that while
the idea of CSA originated in the context of PIR [37], and Lagrange Coded Computing
was introduced in parallel independently in [6] for the context of coded computing, the
two approaches are essentially identical, with CSA codes being slightly more powerful
in the context of coded distributed matrix multiplication (CSA codes offer additional
improvements over LCC codes in terms of download cost [40]). Indeed, LCC codes for
batch matrix multiplication are recovered as a special case of CSA codes.
2. The idea of noise alignment can be applied to the N -CSA codes [40], for N -source
secure coded multi-party batch matrix computation. In [7], Strassen’s construction [44],
combined with LCC, are introduced for batch distributed matrix multiplication. Noise
alignment is also applicable to Strassen’s constructions (see Section VI). By setting
Kc = 1, ` = L and S = R, the construction of GCSA-NA codes, with a straightfor-
ward generalization, can be further modified to settle the asymptotic (the number of
message goes to infinity) capacity of symmetric X-secure T -private computation (and
9also the corresponding private information retrieval setting) [37]. However, the amount
of randomness required by the construction is not necessarily optimal. For example, it
is shown in [37] that by the achievable scheme for XSTPIR, symmetric security (privacy)
is automatically satisfied when T = 1, i.e., no randomness among servers is required.
Polynomial Sharing (PS [41]) GCSA-NA
Strong Security No Yes
Recovery Threshold (R) 2pmn+ 2X − 1 pmn(`+ 1)Kc + 2X − 1
Straggler Tolerance No (S = R) Yes. Tolerates S −R stragglers
Server Network Topology Complete Graph Any Connected Graph
Source Encoding
Complexity
(CeA, CeB)
(
O˜
(
λκS log2 S
pm
)
, O˜
(
κµS log2 S
pn
)) (
O˜
(
λκS log2 S
Kcpm
)
, O˜
(
κµS log2 S
Kcpn
))
Source Upload Cost (UA, UB)
(
S
pm
, S
pn
) (
S
Kcpm
, S
Kcpn
)
Server Communication Cost (CC) S(S−1)mn
S−1
`Kcmn
Server Computation
Complexity
(Cs) O
(
λκµ
pmn
)
+O (λµ) + O˜
(
S log2 Sλµ
mn
)
O
(
λκµ
Kcpmn
)
+O
(
λµ
Kcmn
)
+ O˜
(
λµ log2 S
`Kcmn
)
+O
(
(S−1)λµ
mn
)
≈ O
(
λκµ
pmn
)
if κ
p
 S ≈ O
(
λκµ
Kcpmn
)
if κ
p
 S
Master Download Cost (D) mn+Xmn
R
`Kcmn
Master Decoding Complexity (Cd) O˜
(
λµ log2(mn+X)
) O˜ (λµp log2(R))
TABLE I: Performance Comparison of PS and GCSA-NA.
3. A side-by-side comparison of the GCSA-NA solution with polynomial sharing (PS)
appears in Table I. Because all inter-server communication is independent of input data,
GCSA-NA schemes are strongly secure, i.e., even if all inter-server communication is
leaked it does not compromise the security of input data. In GCSA-NA the inter-server
network graph can be any connected graph. This is not possible with PS. For example,
if the inter-server network graph is a star graph, then the hub server can decode AB
by monitoring all the inter-server communication in a PS scheme, violating the security
constraint. Unlike the PS scheme, in GCSA-NA, all inter-server communication can take
place during off-peak hours, even before the input data is generated, giving GCSA-
NA a significant latency advantage. Unlike PS where every server must communicate
with every server, i.e., S(S − 1) such inter-server communications must take place,
GCSA-NA only requires S−1 inter-server communications to propagate structured noise
terms across all servers. This improvement is shown numerically in Fig. 2a. The server
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computation complexity is also lower for the GCSA-NA scheme than the PS scheme.
This is because in PS, each server needs to multiply the two shares received from the
sources, calculate the shares for every other server and sum up all the shares from every
other server. However, in GCSA-NA, each server only needs to multiply the two shares
received from the sources and add noise (which can be precomputed during off-peak
hours). This advantage is particularly significant for large number of servers. The GCSA-
NA scheme naturally allows robustness to stragglers, which is particularly important
for massive matrix multiplications. Stragglers can be an especially significant concern
for PS because of the strongly sequential nature of multi-round computation that is
central to PS. This is because server failures between computation rounds disrupt the
computation sequence. Remarkably, Fig. 2a shows that the inter-server communication
cost of GCSA-NA is significantly better than PS even when GCSA-NA accommodates
stragglers (while PS does not).
When restricted to batch size 1, i.e., with ` = Kc = 1, GCSA-NA has the same recovery
threshold as PS. Now consider batch processing, i.e., batch size L > 1, e.g., with L =
Kc, ` = 1. PS can be applied to batch processing by repeating the scheme L times. Fig.
2b shows that the normalized server communication cost of GCSA-NA decreases as L
increases and is significantly less than that in PS. For the same number of servers S,
the upload cost of GCSA-NA is smaller by a factor of 1/Kc compared to PS. GCSA-NA
does have higher download cost and decoding complexity than PS by approximately a
factor of p, which depends on how the matrices are partitioned. If p is a small value,
e.g., p = 1, then the costs are quite similar. The improvement in download cost and
decoding complexity of PS by a factor of 1/p comes at the penalty of increased inter-
server communication cost by a factor of S. But since S ≥ R ≥ 2pmn + 2X − 1 ≥ p,
and typically S  p, the improvement is dominated by the penalty, so that overall the
communication cost of PS is still significantly higher.
IV. TOY EXAMPLE
Let us consider a toy example with parameters λ = κ = µ,m = n = 1, p = 2, l = 1, Kc =
2, X = 1 and S = R. Suppose matrices A,B ∈ Fλ×λ, and we wish to multiply matrix
A = [A1 A2] with matrix B =
[
BT1 B
T
2
]T
to compute the product AB = A1B1 +A2B2,
11
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Fig. 2: λ = κ = µ, p = m = n. (a) Server communication cost vs. partition size, given
L = 1 and X = 5. (b) Server communication cost vs. batch size, given p = 2 and X = 5.
where A1,A2 ∈ Fλ×λ2 ,B1,B2 ∈ Fλ2×λ. For this toy example we summarize both the
Polynomial Sharing approach [41], [45], [46], and our GCSA-NA approach.
A. Polynomial Sharing Solution
Polynomial sharing is based on EP code [5] . The given partitioning corresponds to
EP code construction for m = n = 1, p = 2, and we have
P = A1 + αA2, Q = αB1 +B2 (7)
=⇒ PQ = A1B2 + α(A1B1 +A2B2) + α2A2B1. (8)
To satisfy X = 1 security, PS includes noise with each share, i.e., A˜ = P + α2ZA, B˜ =
Q + α2ZB, where α, A˜, B˜ are generic variables that should be replaced with αs, A˜s, B˜s
for Server s, and α1, · · · , αS are distinct elements. Each server computes the product of
the shares that it receives, i.e.,
A˜B˜ = PQ+ α2PZB + α2ZAQ+ α4ZAZB (9)
= A1B2 + α(A1B1 +A2B2) + α
2(A2B1 +A1Z
B + ZAB2) + α
3(A2Z
B + ZAB1) + α
4ZAZB . (10)
To secure inputs from the master, PS requires that every server sends to the master
only the desired term A1B1 + A2B2 by using secret sharing scheme among servers.
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Since degα(A˜B˜) = 4, A1B1 + A2B2 can be calculated from 5 distinct A˜B˜ according to
the Lagrange interpolation rules. In particular, there exist 5 constants r1, · · · , r5, such
that A1B1 +A2B2 =
∑
s∈[5] rsA˜
sB˜s. Consider Server s, it sends Ms→j = rsA˜sB˜s +αjZs to
Server j, where Z1, · · · ,Z5 are i.i.d. uniform noise matrices. After Server s collects all
the shares Mj→s, it sums them up
Ys =
∑
j∈[5]
Mj→s =
∑
j∈[5]
rjA˜
jB˜j + αs
∑
j∈[5]
Zj = A1B1 +A2B2 + αs
∑
j∈[5]
Zj, (11)
and sends Ys to the master. Note that after receiving Mj→s for all j ∈ [5], Server s still
gains no information about the input data, which guarantees the security. However, it
does not satisfy strong security, because AB can be decoded based on Mj→s, j, s ∈ [5].
The master can decode AB after collecting 2 responses from servers.3 Note that PS
needs at least S = R = 5 servers, since 5 distinct A˜B˜ are required to obtain Ys.
B. GCSA-NA Solution
GCSA codes [40] can handle batch processing, therefore let us consider batch size 2
(` = 1, Kc = 2). Denote the second instance by A′,B′. Using CSA code,
P = A1 + (f − α)A2, Q = (f − α)B1 +B2. (12)
P ′ = A′1 + (f
′ − α)A′2, Q′ = (f ′ − α)B′1 +B′2. (13)
and the shares are constructed as follows,
A˜ = ∆
(
P
(f − α)2 +
P ′
(f ′ − α)2
)
, B˜ =
Q
(f − α)2 +
Q′
(f ′ − α)2 (14)
where ∆ = (f − α)2(f ′ − α)2, and α, A˜, B˜ are generic variables that should be replaced
with αs, A˜s, B˜s for Server s. Furthermore, f, f ′, α1, α2, · · · , αS are distinct elements. Each
server computes the product of the shares that it receives, i.e.,
A˜B˜ =
c0
(f − α)2PQ+
c1
f − αPQ+
c′0
(f ′ − α)2P
′Q′ +
c′1
f ′ − αP
′Q′ + I0 + αI1 + α2I2 (15)
=
c0A1B2
(f − α)2 +
c0A1B1 + c0A2B2 + c1A1B2
f − α +
c′0A
′
1B
′
2
(f ′ − α)2 +
c′0A
′
1B
′
1 + c
′
0A
′
2B
′
2 + c
′
1A
′
1B
′
2
f ′ − α
+ I0 + αI1 + α
2I2, (16)
3In [46], for arbitrary polynomials, Ms→j = rsA˜sB˜s + α2jZs because Ys is forced to be casted in the form of
entangled polynomial sharing.
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where I0, I1, I2 are combinations of PQ,P ′Q′, PQ′, P ′Q and c0, c1, c′0, c′1 are constants. This
is the original GCSA code [40], and we need R = pmn((`+1)Kc−1)+p−1 = 7 responses
to recover the desired product.
Next, let us modify the scheme to make it X = 1 secure by including noise with each
share, i.e.,
A˜ = ∆
(
P
(f − α)2 +
P ′
(f ′ − α)2 + Z
A
)
, B˜ =
Q
(f − α)2 +
Q′
(f ′ − α)2 + Z
B. (17)
=⇒ A˜B˜ = c0PQ
(f − α)2 +
c1PQ
f − α +
c′0P
′Q′
(f ′ − α)2 +
c′1P
′Q′
f ′ − α +
4∑
i=0
αiIi. (18)
As a result of the added noise terms, the recovery threshold is now increased to 9.
Note that the term I4 contains only contributions from ∆ZAZB, i.e., this term leaks no
information about A,B matrices.
If the servers directly return their computed values of A˜B˜ to the master, then besides
the result of the computation some additional information about the input matrices
A,B may be leaked by the interference terms(
c0
(f − α)2 +
c1
f − α
)
A1B2 +
(
c′0
(f ′ − α)2 +
c′1
f ′ − α
)
A′1B
′
2 +
3∑
i=0
αiIi (19)
which can be secured by the addition of aligned noise terms
Z˜ =
(
c0
(f − α)2 +
c1
f − α
)
Z+
(
c′0
(f ′ − α)2 +
c′1
f ′ − α
)
Z′ +
3∑
i=0
αiZi (20)
at each server so that the answer returned by each server to the master is A˜B˜+ Z˜. Here
Z,Z′,Z0,Z1,Z2,Z3 are i.i.d. uniform noise matrices, that can all be privately generated
by one server, who can then share their aligned form Z˜ with all other servers. This
sharing of Z˜ is the only inter-server communication needed in GCSA-NA. Since it is
independent of the inputs, it can be done during off-peak hours, thereby reducing the
latency of server computation. The strong security is also automatically satisfied.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF GCSA-NA
Now let us present the general construction. L = `Kc instances of A and B matrices
are split into ` groups. ∀l ∈ [`],∀k ∈ [Kc], denote
Al,k = A(Kc(l−1)+k), Bl,k = B(Kc(l−1)+k). (21)
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Further, each matrix Al,k is partitioned into m × p blocks and each matrix Bl,k is
partitioned into p× n blocks, i.e.,
Al,k =

Al,k1,1 A
l,k
1,2 · · · Al,k1,p
Al,k2,1 A
l,k
2,2 · · · Al,k2,p
...
...
...
...
Al,km,1 A
l,k
m,2 · · · Al,km,p
 ,B
l,k =

Bl,k1,1 B
l,k
1,2 · · · Bl,k1,n
Bl,k2,1 B
l,k
2,2 · · · Bl,k2,n
...
...
...
...
Bl,kp,1 B
l,k
p,2 · · · Bl,kp,n
 ,
where
(
Al,ki,j
)
i∈[m],j∈[p]
∈ F λm×κp and
(
Bl,ki,j
)
i∈[m],j∈[p]
∈ Fκp×µn .
Let f1,1, f1,2, · · · , f`,Kc , α1, α2, · · · , αS be (S +L) distinct elements from the field F. For
convenience, define
R′ = pmn, DE = max(pm, pmn− pm+ p)− 1, (22)
E = {p+ p(m′ − 1) + pm(n′′ − 1) | m′ ∈ [m], n′′ ∈ [n]} , (23)
∆l,Kcs =
∏
k∈[Kc]
(fl,k − αs)R′ ,∀l ∈ [`],∀s ∈ [S]. (24)
Define cl,k,i, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , R′(Kc − 1)} to be the coefficients satisfying
Ψl,k(α) =
∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k}
(α + (fl,k′ − fl,k))R
′
=
R′(Kc−1)∑
i=0
cl,k,iα
i,∀l ∈ [`],∀k ∈ [Kc], (25)
i.e., they are the coefficients of the polynomial Ψl,k(α) =
∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k} (α + (fl,k′ − fl,k))R
′
,
which is defined by its roots. Note that all the coefficients (cl,k,i)l∈[L],k∈[Kc],i∈{0,1,··· ,R′(Kc−1)},
α[S], (fl,k)l∈[L],k∈[K] are globally known.
A. Sharing
Firstly, each source encodes each constituent matrix blocks Al,k and Bl,k with Entan-
gled Polynomial code [5]. For all l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], define
P l,ks =
∑
m′∈[m]
∑
p′∈[p]
Al,km′,p′(fl,k − αs)p
′−1+p(m′−1), (26)
Ql,ks =
∑
p′′∈[p]
∑
n′′∈[n]
Bl,kp′′,n′′(fl,k − αs)p−p
′′+pm(n′′−1). (27)
Note that the original Entangled Polynomial code can be regarded as polynomials of
αs, and here for each (l, k), Entangled Polynomial code is constructed as polynomials
of (fl,k − αs).
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Each source generates `X independent random matrices, ZA = {ZA1,1, · · · ,ZA`,X} and
ZB = {ZB1,1, · · · ,ZB`,X}. The independence is established as follows.
H(ZA,ZB,A,B) = H(A) +H(B) +
∑
l∈[`],x∈[X]
H
(
ZAl,x
)
+
∑
l∈[`],x∈[X]
H
(
ZBl,x
)
. (28)
For all s ∈ [S], the shares of matrices A and B at the sth server are constructed as
A˜s = (A˜s1, A˜
s
2, . . . , A˜
s
`), B˜
s = (B˜s1, B˜
s
2, . . . , B˜
s
` ), where for all l ∈ [`],
A˜sl = ∆
l,Kc
s
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
P l,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
A
l,x
 , B˜sl = ∑
k∈[Kc]
Ql,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
B
l,x. (29)
Then each pair of shares A˜s, B˜s is sent to the corresponding server.
B. Computation and Communication
One of the servers generates a set of λ
m
× µ
n
matrices Zserver, which contains R′(Kc −
1) + X + DE + `Kc(p − 1)mn independent random matrices and `Kcmn zero matrices.
In particular, Zserver = {Zserver1 ,Zserver2 }, Zserver1 = {Z′i | i ∈ [R′(Kc − 1) +X +DE]}, and
Zserver2 =
{
Z′′l,k,i | l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], i ∈ [R′]
}
. Here,
Z′′l,k,i =
0, if i ∈ EZ′′′l,k,i, otherwise, ∀l ∈ [`],∀k ∈ [Kc].
Here Z′i and Z′′′l,k,i are the independent random matrices. The independence is established
as follows.
H(Zserver,A,B) = H(A) +H(B) +
∑
i∈[R′(Kc−1)+X+DE ]
H(Z′i) +
∑
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
H(Z′′l,k,i). (30)
Without loss of generality, assume the first server generates Zserver, encodes them into
M˜s =
∑
x∈[R′(Kc−1)+X+DE ]
αx−1s Z
′
x +
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k.i−i′Z
′′
l,k,i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i , (31)
and sends M˜s to server s, s ∈ [S]\{1}, where cl,k,i is defined in (25). The answer returned
by the sth server to the master is constructed as Ys =
∑
l∈[`] A˜
s
l B˜
s
l + M˜s.
C. Reconstruction
After the master collects any R answers, it decodes the desired products AB.
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D. Proof of Theorem 1
To begin, let us recall the standard result for Confluent Cauchy-Vandermonde matrices
[47], replicated here for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 1. If f1,1, f1,2, · · · , f`,Kc , α1, α2, · · · , αR are R + L distinct elements of F, with |F| ≥
R+L, L = `Kc and R = R′(`+1)Kc+2X−1, then the R×R Confluent Cauchy-Vandermonde
matrix (32) is invertible over F.
Vˆ`,Kc,R′,X,R ,

1
(f1,1−α1)R′ · · ·
1
f1,1−α1 · · · 1(f`,Kc−α1)R′ · · ·
1
f`,Kc−α1 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
1
1
(f1,1−α2)R′ · · ·
1
f1,1−α2 · · · 1(f`,Kc−α2)R′ · · ·
1
f`,Kc−α2 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
(f1,1−αR)R′ · · ·
1
f1,1−αR · · · 1(f`,Kc−αR)R′ · · ·
1
f`,Kc−αR 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
R

(32)
Firstly, let us prove that the GCSA-NA codes are R = pmn(`+1)Kc+2X−1 recoverable.
Rewrite Ys as follows.
Ys = A˜
s
1B˜
s
1 + A˜
s
2B˜
s
2 + · · ·+ A˜s`B˜s` + M˜s (33)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∆l,Kcs
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
P l,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
A
l,x
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
Ql,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
B
l,x
+ M˜s (34)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∆l,Kcs
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
P l,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
Ql,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′
+ ∑
l∈[`]
∆l,Kcs
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
P l,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′
 ∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
B
l,x

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ2
+
∑
l∈[`]
∆l,Kcs
 ∑
k∈[Kc]
Ql,ks
(fl,k − αs)R′
 ∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
A
l,x

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ3
+
∑
l∈[`]
∆l,Kcs
 ∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
A
l,x
 ∑
x∈[X]
αx−1s Z
B
l,x

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ4
+M˜s
(35)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k}(fl,k′ − αs)R
′
(fl,k − αs)R′ P
l,k
s Q
l,k
s +
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k,k′∈[Kc]
k 6=k′
 ∏
k′′∈[Kc]\{k,k′}
(fl,k′′ − αs)R′
P l,ks Ql,k′s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ1
+ Γ2 + Γ3 + Γ4 + M˜s. (36)
Consider the first term in (36). For each l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], we have∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k}(fl,k′ − αs)R
′
(fl,k − αs)R′ P
l,k
s Q
l,k
s
=
∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k} ((fl,k − αs) + (fl,k′ − fl,k))
R′
(fl,k − αs)R′ P
l,k
s Q
l,k
s (37)
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=
Ψl,k(fl,k − αs)
(fl,k − αs)R′ P
l,k
s Q
l,k
s (38)
=
(
cl,k,0
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
cl,k,1
(fl,k − αs)R′−1 + · · ·+
cl,k,R′−1
fl,k − αs
)
P l,ks Q
l,k
s
+
R′(Kc−1)∑
i=R′
cl,k,i(fl,k − αs)i−R′
P l,ks Ql,ks︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ5
. (39)
where (38) results from the definition of Ψl,k(·) as in (25) and in (39) the polynomial
Ψl,k(fl,k − αs) is rewritten in terms of its coefficients.
By the construction of Entangled Polynomial code (26) (27), the product P l,ks Ql,ks can
be written as weighted sums of the terms 1, (fl,k − αs), · · · , (fl,k − αs)R′+p−2, i.e.,
P l,ks Q
l,k
s =
R′+p−2∑
i=0
Cl,ki+1(fl,k − αs)i, (40)
where Cl,k1 ,C
l,k
2 , · · · ,Cl,kR′+p−1 are various linear combinations of products of blocks of
Al,k and blocks of Bl,k. Consider the first term in (39).(
cl,k,0
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
cl,k,1
(fl,k − αs)R′−1 + · · ·+
cl,k,R′−1
fl,k − αs
)
P l,ks Q
l,k
s
(40)
=
(
cl,k,0
(fl,k − αs)R′ +
cl,k,1
(fl,k − αs)R′−1 + · · ·+
cl,k,R′−1
fl,k − αs
) R′+p−2∑
i=0
Cl,ki+1(fl,k − αs)i (41)
=
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k,i−i′C
l,k
i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i +
p−2∑
i=0
(fl,k − αs)i
(
R′+i′∑
i′=i+1
cl,k,R′−i′+iC
l,k
i′+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ6
+
R′+p−3∑
i=p−1
(fl,k − αs)i
(
R′+p−2∑
i′=i+1
cl,k,R′−i′+iC
l,k
i′+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ7
. (42)
Note that if Kc = 1, ∀i 6= 0, cl,k,i = 0, then Γ5 and Γ7 are zero polynomials. Now let us
consider the degree with respect to αs of Γ1, · · · ,Γ7.
degαs (Γ1) =
R
′(Kc − 1) + p− 2, if Kc > 1
−1, otherwise
, degαs (Γ2) = R
′(Kc − 1) + pm+X − 2,
degαs (Γ3) = R
′(Kc − 1) + pmn− pm+ p+X − 2, degαs (Γ4) = R′Kc + 2X − 2, degαs (Γ6) = p− 2,
degαs (Γ5) =
R
′(Kc − 1) + p− 2, if Kc > 1
−1, otherwise
, degαs (Γ7) =
R
′ + p− 3, if Kc > 1
−1, otherwise
.
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Recall X, p,m, n,Kc are positive integers. If Kc > 1, it is easy to see that R′Kc+2X−2
is the largest. If Kc = 1, R′ = pmn ≥ p > p − 2, R′Kc + 2X − 2 is also the largest.
Therefore the sum of Γ1, · · · ,Γ7 can be expanded into weighted sums of the terms
1, αs, · · · , αR′Kc+2X−2s . Note that the weights of terms αR
′(Kc−1)+X+DE+1
s , · · · , αR′Kc+2X−2s
are functions of ZA,ZB. Ys can be rewritten as
Ys =
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k,i−i′C
l,k
i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i +
∑
x∈[R′Kc+2X−1]
αx−1s Ix + M˜s (43)
(31)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k,i−i′C
l,k
i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i +
∑
x∈[R′Kc+2X−1]
αx−1s Ix +
∑
x∈[R′(Kc−1)+X+DE ]
αx−1s Z
′
x
+
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k.i−i′Z
′′
l,k,i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i (44)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k,i−i′
(
Cl,ki′+1 + Z
′′
l,k,i′+1
)
(fl,k − αs)R′−i +
∑
x∈[R′(Kc−1)+X+DE ]
αx−1s (Ix + Z
′
x)
+
R′Kc+2X−1∑
x=R′(Kc−1)+X+DE+1
αx−1s Ix (45)
=
∑
l∈[`]
∑
k∈[Kc]
R′−1∑
i=0
∑i
i′=0 cl,k,i−i′D
l,k
i′+1
(fl,k − αs)R′−i +
∑
x∈[R′Kc+2X−1]
αx−1s Jx, (46)
where Dl,ki = C
l,k
i +Z
′′
l,k,i, l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], i ∈ [R′], Jx = Ix +Z′x, x ∈ [R′(Kc− 1) +X +DE]
and Jx = Ix, x ∈ [R′(Kc − 1) +X +DE + 1 : R′Kc + 2X − 1]. In the matrix form, answers
from any R = R′Kc + 2X − 1 +R′L = pmn(`+ 1)Kc + 2X − 1 servers, whose indices are
denoted as s1, s2, · · · , sR, can be written as (47).
Ys1
Ys2
...
YsR
 =

1
(f1,1−αs1 )R′
· · · 1f1,1−αs1 · · ·
1
(f`,Kc−αs1 )R′
· · · 1f`,Kc−αs1 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
s1
1
(f1,1−αs2 )R′
· · · 1f1,1−αs2 · · ·
1
(f`,Kc−αs2 )R′
· · · 1f`,Kc−αs2 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
s2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
(f1,1−αsR )R
′ · · · 1f1,1−αsR · · ·
1
(f`,Kc−αsR )R
′ · · · 1f`,Kc−αsR 1 · · · α
R′Kc+2X−2
sR

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vˆ`,Kc,R′,X,R
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
T(c1,1,0, · · · , c1,1,R′−1)
. . .
T(c`,Kc,0, · · · , c`,Kc,R′−1)
IR−R′L

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vˆ′
`,Kc,R′,X,R
⊗Iλ/m

D1,11
...
D1,1R′
...
D`,Kc1
...
D`,KcR′
J1
...
JR′Kc+2X−1

. (47)
Since f1,1, f1,2, · · · , f`,Kc are distinct, for all l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], cl,k,0 =
∏
k′∈[Kc]\{k}(fl,k′−fl,k)R
′
are non-zero. Hence, the lower triangular toeplitz matrices T(c1,1,0, · · · , c1,1,R′−1), · · · ,
T(c`,Kc,0, · · · , c`,Kc,R′−1) are non-singular, and the block diagonal matrix Vˆ′`,Kc,R′,X,R is
invertible. Guaranteed by Lemma 1 and the fact that the Kronecker product of non-
singular matrices is non-singular, the matrix (Vˆ`,Kc,R′,X,RVˆ′`,Kc,R′,X,R)⊗ Iλ/m is invertible.
Therefore, the master is able to recover
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
by inverting the matrix. Note
that Z′′l,k,i = 0, l ∈ [`], k ∈ [Kc], i ∈ E , therefore
(
Cl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈E
=
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈E
.
The desired products (A(l)B(l))l∈[L] are recoverable from
(
Cl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈E
, guaranteed
by the correctness of Entangled Polynomial code [5]. This completes the proof of recov-
ery threshold R = pmn(`+ 1)Kc + 2X − 1.
Consider the strong security property. According to the construction, M1 = 0, Ms =
M˜s, s ∈ [S] \ {1}, and M = {M˜s | s ∈ [S] \ {1}}. Since M˜s is a function of Zserver,
I(A,B, A˜[S], B˜[S];M) ≤ I(A,B, A˜[S], B˜[S];Zserver) = 0. (48)
Strong security is satisfied. Security is guaranteed because ∀X ⊂ [S], |X | = X ,
I(A,B; A˜X , B˜X ,MX ) = I(A,B;MX ) + I(A,B; A˜X , B˜X | MX ) (49)
= I(A,B;MX ) + I(A,B; A˜X , B˜X ) = 0, (50)
where (50) is due to (28), (30) and the facts that each share is encoded with (X,S)
Reed-Solomon code with uniformly and independently distributed noise.
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Consider the privacy property,
I(Y1, Y2, · · · , YS ;A,B | AB) = I
((
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
, (Jx)x∈[R′Kc+2X−1];A,B | AB
)
(51)
= I
((
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
;A,B | AB
)
+ I
(
(Jx)x∈[R′Kc+2X−1];A,B | AB,
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
)
(52)
= I
(
(Jx)x∈[R′Kc+2X−1];A,B | AB,
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
)
(53)
≤ I
(
(Jx)x∈[R′Kc+2X−1];A,B,AB,
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
)
(54)
≤ I
(
Zserver1 ,ZA,ZB ;A,B,
(
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
)
= 0, (55)
where (51) holds because the map from
((
Dl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈[R′]
, (Jx)x∈[R′Kc+2X−1]
)
to (Y1, · · · , YS)
is bijective. Equation (53) holds due to (30) and the fact
(
Cl,ki
)
l∈[`],k∈[Kc],i∈E
are functions
of AB.
Consider the communication cost. The source upload cost UA = SKcpm and UB =
S
Kcpn
.
The server communication cost CC = S−1
`Kcmn
. Note that the master is able to recover
Lmn desired symbols from R downloaded symbols, the master download cost is D =
R
Lmn
= pmn(`+1)Kc+2X−1
`Kcmn
. Thus the desired costs are achievable.
Now let us consider the computation complexity. Note that the source encoding pro-
cedure can be regarded as products of confluent Cauchy matrices by vectors. So by fast
algorithms [48], the encoding complexity of (CeA, CeB) =
(
O˜
(
λκS log2 S
Kcpm
)
, O˜
(
κµS log2 S
Kcpn
))
is
achievable. For the server computation complexity, each server multiplies the ` pairs of
shares A˜sl , B˜
s
l , l ∈ [`], and returns the sum of these ` products and structured noise M˜s.
With straightforward matrix multiplication algorithms, each of the ` matrix products has
a computation complexity of O
(
λκµ
pmn
)
for a total of O
(
`λκµ
pmn
)
. The complexity of summa-
tion over the products and noise is O ( `λµ
mn
)
. To construct the noise, one server needs to
encode the noise, whose complexity is O˜
(
λµS log2 S
mn
)
by fast algorithms [48]. Normalized
by the number of servers, it is O˜
(
λµ log2 S
mn
)
. Considering these 3 procedures, upon
normalization by L = `Kc, it yields a complexity of O
(
λκµ
Kcpmn
)
+O
(
λµ
Kcmn
)
+O˜
(
λµ log2 S
`Kcmn
)
per server. The master decoding complexity is inherited from that of GCSA codes [40],
which is at most O˜(λµp log2R). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark: When L = ` = Kc = 1, S = R, by setting f1,1 = 0, our construction of shares
of A˜s and B˜s essentially recovers the construction of shares in [41].
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, the class of GCSA codes is expanded by including noise-alignment, so
that the resulting GCSA-NA code is a solution for secure coded multi-party computation
of massive matrix multiplication. For two sources and matrix multiplication, GCSA-NA
strictly generalizes PS [41] and outperforms it in several key aspects. This construc-
tion also settles the asymptotic capacity of symmetric X-secure T -private information
retrieval. The idea of noise-alignment can be applied to construct a scheme for N
sources based on N -CSA codes, and be combined with Strassen’s construction. As open
problems, exploring the optimal amount of randomness and finding the communication
efficient schemes for arbitrary polynomial are interesting directions.
Since Strassen’s algorithm [44] is an important fast matrix multiplication approach,
it is interesting to show noise alignment can be combined with it for secure multi-
party matrix multiplication. Consider an example with two 2 × 2 block matrices A,B
and X = 1. It can be shown that the general recursive Strassen’s algorithm also works
similarly. The desired product C =
C1,1 C1,2
C2,1 C2,2
. The Strassen’s constuction constructs
14 matrices Pi, Qi, i ∈ [7] (Pi only depends on A and Qi only depends on B) and
C1,1
C1,2
C2,1
C2,2
 =

0 −1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 1 0 −1


P1Q1
P2Q2
...
P7Q7.
 (56)
This is the basic Strassen algorithm. Now let us see how we apply CSA and noise
alignment to it. Each share is constructed based on CSA code principles with noise, i.e.,
A˜ = ∆
∑
i∈[7]
Pi
fi − α + Z
A
 , B˜ = ∑
i∈[7]
Qi
fi − α + Z
B , A˜B˜ =
∑
i∈[7]
ci
fi − αPiQi +
7∑
i=0
αiIi. (57)
If the servers directly return A˜B˜ to the master, additional information about the input
may be leaked due to interference terms P1Q1, · · · , P7Q7 and
∑6
i=0 α
iIi. We secure the
scheme by the addition of noise. The idea is that we want the master to decode T1, · · · , T7
instead of P1Q1, · · · , P7Q7, such that
H(C | T1, · · · , T7) = 0, I(A,B;T1, · · · , T7 | C) = 0. (58)
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T1, · · · , Tv are constructed as follows.
T1 = P1Q1 − Z1 − Z2 + Z3, T2 = P2Q2 − Z1 + Z2 − Z3, T3 = P3Q3 − Z1, (59)
T4 = P4Q4 + Z1, T5 = P5Q5 + Z2, T6 = P6Q6 − Z3, T7 = P7Q7 + Z3, (60)
where Z1,Z2,Z3 are i.i.d. uniform noise matrices. To align the noise, we construct Z˜,
Z˜ =
(
− c1
f1 − α −
c2
f2 − α −
c3
f3 − α +
c4
f4 − α
)
Z1 +
(
− c1
f1 − α +
c2
f2 − α +
c5
f5 − α
)
Z2
+
(
c1
f1 − α −
c2
f2 − α −
c6
f6 − α +
c7
f7 − α
)
Z3 +
6∑
i=0
αiZi+4, (61)
where Z4, · · · ,Z10 are i.i.d. uniform noise matrices. The answer returned by each server
to the master is A˜B˜ + Z˜. The correctness and privacy are easily proved.
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